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SURVEY OF N.Y. PRACTICE
other driver, whose negligence contributed to the accident, should not
strip the defendant of his right to obtain apportionment. While it is of
course true that a Dole claim against the other driver individually is
still available, the absence of insurance may effectively make this an
empty right. Where the defendant's own liability insurance coverage
is exceeded by the amount of the plaintiff's judgment, he will be forced
to pay from his own pocket more than he would have if the automobile
with which he collided were occupied by an unmarried couple.
Dole and its progeny have necessitated a complete re-examination
of section 167(3) by the Legislature. In the interim, however, the courts
should be sensitive to the fact that apportionment of damages among
wrongdoers on the basis of their relative fault is now an important
right in the law of negligence and should be available unless stronger
policy considerations would be frustrated.
Gochee v. Wagner abandoned
A long-standing and oft-criticized doctrine whose vitality was ques-
tioned after Dole232 is the Gochee v. Wagner233 rule of imputed con-
tributory negligence in vehicular collision cases. The essense of the doc-
trine is that "[t]he driver's negligence will be imputed to the passenger
to defeat his action whenever the passenger has the exclusive authority
to control the operation of the vehicle, except in a case where the
driver himself is the defendant." 234
The Court of Appeals, in Kalechman v. Drew Auto Rental, Inc.,235
has abandoned the Gochee rule on the ground that it is a "pure legal
fiction, which ... conflicts with public policy." 23 In the classic Gochee
situation, a passenger-owner's action against the driver of the second
car was barred by the imputation to him of his driver's negligence.
This result could, however, be avoided if he initially sued his own
driver, who could then implead the other driver under Dole. Kalech-
man involved a slight variation of these facts. In this case, the passenger
(P) was an employee of the lessee of the defendant's car, which the pas-
senger's father-in-law (D) was driving. P was killed when the car col-
lided with a truck and an action was commenced on behalf of his
232 See Schwab, Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.: A Preliminary Analysis, 45 N.Y. ST. B.J. 144,
159 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Schwab]; Munn v. Morris, -42 App. Div. 2d 545, 546, 345
N.Y.S.2d 20, 23 (1st Dep't 1973) (mem.) (Kupferman, J., dissenting).
233 257 N.Y. 344, 178 N.E. 553 (1931).
234 Kalechman v. Drew Auto Rental, Inc., - N.Y.2d -, - N.E.2d -, - N.Y.S.2d
- (1974).
235 Id.
236 Id. at -, - N.E.2d at -, - N.YS.2d at -.
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distributees against the owner-lessor.237 The complaint was dismissed
by the Appellate Division, Second Department, on the theory that D's
negligence is imputable to P since P had dominion and control over
D.238 The Court of Appeals unanimously reversed and reinstated the
complaint.
While Dole could not have been used to circumvent Gochee in P's
action against the owner-lessor, Judge Wachtler adverted to the fact
that this would be the case in the more usual Gochee situation, 23 9 and
presented other cogent bases for the Court's rejection of this anachronis-
tic rule. He noted that when it developed during the "horse-and-
buggy" days, actual control of the driver by the passenger was a
possibility; today, an attempt to exercise control would generally not
only be unsuccessful but dangerous.240 Furthermore, the trend of the
law has been to eliminate immunities based upon some special relation-
ship241 and Gochee contravenes this policy. Thus, the Court held that
"the plaintiff passenger [is entitled] to recover for negligent operation
of the vehicle - no matter what his relationship to the driver may
be - unless it is shown that his own personal negligence contributed
to the injury. '242 With this statement, the Court has reaffirmed its
allegiance to the contributory negligence rule, and has once again de-
clined to adopt a full comparative negligence system.243 But its elimina-
tion of the antiquated doctrine of imputed contributory negligence is
a long-overdue and sensible adaptation of the law to reality, and was
in any event inevitable in light of Dole.244
237 See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 388 (McKinney 1970).
238 38 App. Div. 2d 974, 331 N.Y.S.2d 711 (2d Dep't 1972) (mer.).
239- N.Y.2d at - n.1, - N.E.2d at - n.1, - N.Y.S.2d at - n.1; see Schwab,
supra note 232, at 159.
240 Id. at-, - N.E.2d at-, - N.Y.S.2d at -.
241 See Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969)
(intrafamily immunity); N.Y. GEN OBLIG. LAW § 3-313 (McKinney 1964) (interspousal
immunity).
242 - N.Y.2d at -, N.E.2d at - - N.Y.S.2d at
243 See Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973).
244 The abandonment of Gochee is also significant in the fact that it will increase the
number of situations in which section 167(3) of the Insurance Law will be brought into
play. See text accompanying notes 223-31 supra. Even before the demise of Gochee, the
owner-passenger had a right of action against his own driver. Kleinman v. Frank, 34 App.
Div. 2d 121, 309 N.Y.S.2d 651 (2d Dep't 1970), aff'd without opinion, 28 N.Y.2d 603, 268
N.E.2d 648, 319 N.Y.S.2d 852 (1971). Since it was often the case that the passenger and
driver were spouses, the former would often refrain from suing because section 167(3)
eliminated insurance coverage. Now that the bar to his suit against the other driver has
been removed, the incidence of Dole claims in the face of section 167(3) will multiply. This
further intensifies the urgency for a resolution of the question of the section's applicability
in Dole contexts.
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